Image result for flogging a dead horse

And still Mr Wear repeats the good ol’ Nazi apologist mantra.

Soviet Preparations for Offensive War

That would be Soviet preparations for a potential threat from Germany and believe it or not a perceived threat from Britain. The rearmament of Soviet forces was a response to the dramatic rearmament of German forces and the very realistic threat of invasion in an uncertain future. As I have previously stated, Stalin was more concerned about the safety and security of the USSR in the 1930s than he was about some mythical invasion of western Europe.

The vast bulk of Mr Wear’s most recent article is nothing more than an explanation of Soviet military doctrine, a doctrine which I have laid out in a previous article:

Here we must look in some detail at Soviet military tactics. The Soviets believed in an aggressive defense. This could be seen in 4 stages:

  1. The Soviets believe that the enemy would need between 2 to 3 weeks in order to launch fully their offensive. In this period only small scale assaults would take place.
  2. During this delay the Red Army would seize the initiative. As the bulk of the mobilised army would have been positioned close to the front they would be able to block all incursions and protect the general mobilisation call in the USSR.
  3. The second task of the army in place would be to go on the offensive on the 3rd day of the invasion and carry the battle to the invaders. The aim would be to penetrate hundreds of kilometers in order to put the enemy build up off balance. This penetration would be supported by massive air support.
  4. A second wave of now mobilised Soviet forces would relieve the initial breakthrough and carry on the battle in the heart of enemy territory.

For this tactic to work, it was vital that as many forces were as close to the German front line as possible. The only problem was that Stalin did not want to antagonise Hitler and so did not put them on a fully mobilised footing. When the Germans attacked en masse in a single blow in June 1941, the Soviet forces were unprepared: Russian units were not fully mobilized, ammunition had not been distributed, planes were not ready on their airfields and lines of communication not set up. The results were catastrophic for the Soviets.

https://wearswarts.wordpress.com/2017/11/17/germanys-incredible-courage-to-defend-europe-or-the-myth-of-the-soviet-invasion-of-1941/

The following statement by Mr Wear is simply stunning in its absurdity:

Hitler waited until January 1942 before he made the decision to gradually begin the shift of industry from a peacetime to a wartime regime.

Hitler had just invaded France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Yugoslavia and was fighting it out with Britain…whilst still having its industry on a peacetime footing?!

Seriously?

The reality was that all peacetime industry in Germany had disappeared shortly after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. Employment was in the war industries with very few building motorways.

The occupation of these Baltic countries by the Red Army made sense only if there were plans for an aggressive war against Germany.

Not at all Mr Wear. The occupation of the Baltic countries made a great deal of sense if you wanted to keep German forces as far away from the Russian border as possible.

The Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940.

In order to protect this area of the Balkans and the Black Sea littoral…from a perceived threat from Britain. Stalin did not trust Britain either. Stalin feared interference from all western countries and not just Germany.

In the summer of 1941, the Red Army began using the new multiple-launcher rocket weapons BM-8 and BM-13.

Eh? This is totally irrelevant as to Soviet intentions because they came out AFTER the invasion of the USSR by the Germans.

 the Soviet 9th Army was the most powerful army in the world.

Not in June 1941 it wasn’t.

On May 5, 1941, Stalin made it clear to his generals that the Soviet Union would be the aggressor in a war with Germany.

No he didn’t. Stalin was simply underlining the military doctrine of the USSR; the notion of an offensive defense; the notion of blunting any attack followed by an immediate massive counter attack.

June 13, 1941, marked the beginning of the biggest organized movement of troops, arms, ammunition, and other military supplies in history.

That’s because the Soviets knew about an imminent German invasion. Even so, Stalin would not authorise full mobilization. Indeed, the Soviets were still supplying raw materials to the Germans the day before the invasion as part of the German/Soviet Pact.

This massive troop movement could not have been defensive. Troops preparing for defense dig themselves into the ground, close off roads, establish barbwire barriers, dig anti-tank trenches, and prepare covers behind the barricades.

Yet again, Mr Wear shows a total lack of knowledge of Soviet military tactics of the late 1930s.

Suvorov also dismisses claims that the Soviet Union did not have qualified military leaders in 1941. Stalin did conduct a purge of the military from 1937-1938, but reports that 40,000 military commanders were executed is an exaggeration. Soviet documents show that 1,654 military commanders were either executed or died in prison while awaiting trial during 1937-1938. Since the officer corps of the Red Army in February 1937 numbered 206,000, less than one percent of the Soviet Union’s officers died in Stalin’s purge. Soviet military commanders in 1941 were well-qualified to lead Stalin’s war of aggression against Europe.

Suvorov cites no military documents. He wrote his book AFTER leaving the USSR in the 1970s. He had no access to any documentation. Gabriel Gorodetsky who did have the authorisation to study Soviet documents paints a different picture:

“Between 1937 and September 1938, some 36,700 men had been purged in the army and 3,000 in the navy: 90% of district chiefs of staffs and deputies, 80% of corps and divisional commanders and 90% of staff officers and chiefs of staff.”

Not only that but around 75% of those remaining to face the germans in June 1941 had only 1 year’s experience. This explains the complete collapse of the Soviet army in front of the German onslaught. The Soviet army of 1941 was simply not capable of an adventurous military offensive.

Suvorov also mentions that Soviet soldiers and officers were issued Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books as part of their preparations for an invasion of Europe.

No doubt supplied to Soviet troops in September 1939 when they were sharing Poland with the Germans or to Soviet troops occupying Bessarabia.

Truly Mr Wear is flogging the proverbial dead horse.

 

Advertisements